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security

Security tools (audit + optional fixes).

Related:

Terminal window
coderclaw security audit
coderclaw security audit --deep
coderclaw security audit --fix
coderclaw security audit --json

The audit warns when multiple DM senders share the main session and recommends secure DM mode: session.dmScope="per-channel-peer" (or per-account-channel-peer for multi-account channels) for shared inboxes. It also warns when small models (<=300B) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled. For webhook ingress, it warns when hooks.defaultSessionKey is unset, when request sessionKey overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes. It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when gateway.nodes.denyCommands uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries, when global tools.profile="minimal" is overridden by agent tool profiles, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy.

Use --json for CI/policy checks:

Terminal window
coderclaw security audit --json | jq '.summary'
coderclaw security audit --deep --json | jq '.findings[] | select(.severity=="critical") | .checkId'

If --fix and --json are combined, output includes both fix actions and final report:

Terminal window
coderclaw security audit --fix --json | jq '{fix: .fix.ok, summary: .report.summary}'

--fix applies safe, deterministic remediations:

  • flips common groupPolicy="open" to groupPolicy="allowlist" (including account variants in supported channels)
  • sets logging.redactSensitive from "off" to "tools"
  • tightens permissions for state/config and common sensitive files (credentials/*.json, auth-profiles.json, sessions.json, session *.jsonl)

--fix does not:

  • rotate tokens/passwords/API keys
  • disable tools (gateway, cron, exec, etc.)
  • change gateway bind/auth/network exposure choices
  • remove or rewrite plugins/skills